A Risk Assessment for Media Organizations in a Second Trump Administration

Why a Risk Assessment?

Many news organizations use risk assessments to analyze and respond to possible threats related to a particular assignment or to the environment in which their journalists work. This has been part of journalistic practice for some time, particularly for international reporting and in conflict environments. In recent years, risk assessments have become more widespread in newsrooms and also in a US context.

There is no “right” or standard way to do a risk assessment. In some news organizations, the risk assessments process is more ad hoc, consisting of a conversation between reporters and editors. In others, particularly when a higher level of risk is identified, the process is formalized, involving documentation, contingency planning and sometimes approval

The essential feature of a risk assessment is that it involves an analysis of the likelihood of a particular risk and the consequences of failure. It often also includes a process for mitigating the identified risk that takes into account the available resources. The goal is to weigh the editorial value of a given story against the risks to decide whether it’s worth pursuing. In the overwhelming majority of cases, it is. Risk assessments also help news organizations and individual journalists allocate available resources to most effectively reduce the likelihood and/or severity of the identified consequences,

What Is the Purpose of This Document?

The risk environment for the media in the second Trump term is complex and will vary tremendously depending on the nature of the media organization, where it is located, and what it covers. It will also vary depending on the identity, profile and activities of individual reporters, that is who they are, what they are doing and how they are perceived. Individual journalists’ and newsrooms will also vary in their appetite and tolerance for risk.

This document is intended to provide a collective baseline based on feedback from a range of journalists, newsroom leaders, safety experts, press freedom advocates, and legal experts. We have identified the key threats for both news organizations and individual journalists and suggest basic mitigation strategies and essential resources. However, identity and context are at the heart of every risk analysis. Each news organization should use this document as a starting point for carrying out its own risk assessment and should adapt and modify this document to reflect its own experience.

One final note: A risk assessment is not a roadmap for advocacy or strategic litigation. Its purpose is to help news organizations and journalists report in an environment that has become increasingly adversarial. This is separate from the critical work being done by leading advocacy organizations – often with the support of newsrooms – to combat threats to press freedom and media safety at a more systematic and structural level.

1. General News Gathering Risks

Risk Factors to Consider

• Trump pays little heed to conventional norms. His actions can be very unpredictable. It’s impossible to know what news stories might spark a controversy or catch the eyes of Trumpworld and potentially place journalists in danger. A simple stock market report on sinking share prices could conceivably be seen by him or his supporters as a critique of his economic management and credentials as a successful entrepreneur. Some of his cabinet nominees, actions, and decisions are so unconventional it is difficult to write an objective news story without coming across as incredulous. This means that few news stories about the government, the economy, the environment, or cultural issues, during the second Trump administration can be regarded as routine and without risk.

• Any reporting viewed as critical by the Trump administration or its supporters can be expected to generate a reaction. The reaction will sometimes be ferocious, and journalists can expect to be berated, perhaps on live TV, by angry officials or Trump himself. This could in turn trigger a response from supporters in the form of online harassment and related abuse, and in some instances, physical threats. Journalists may fear for their own safety and that of their families. They might suffer emotional consequences and may need to take steps to boost their physical security.

• In extreme cases, journalists could be attacked while reporting in the streets, and there may be bomb threats or other types of attacks on the offices of news organizations. Journalists have been stalked and confronted by Trump supporters while reporting in the field, and are routinely singled out by Trump and verbally abused by Trump supporters at his rallies.

• Many media outlets have been branded “fake news” and “enemies of the people” by Trump and are viewed as such by his supporters. There could be areas of the country or events where visible branding for some outlets could place reporting teams at risk of harassment or confrontation. This is not limited just to the particular media identified by name by Trump and his circle over the past few years but has implications for all media.

• The identity of individual journalists, and of individual news outlets, could place some under more threat than others in an environment in which “anti-wokeness,” misogyny, racism, and religious intolerance are on the rise. This could have implications for how women, Black, and Latino journalists and journalists from marginalized groups may be treated as they report on the government or aggressively question officials as part of their job.

• The risk will likely play out in three dimensions: Identity of individual reporters - LGBTQ+, immigrant, Black, women, etc; Identity of audience served - for example: Haitian diaspora, trans youth, Latino immigrants in NYC, etc; Identity of outlet based on coverage - for example, Black press, immigrant-led outlets covering immigrant or ethnic communities, outlets covering education, outlets covering women and reproductive health, etc.

• Some community groups may be especially targeted depending on whatever is thrust to the front of the news agenda at any given time by Trump or others. The Haitian Times closed down its comments section after a surge in racist, xenophobic, and misogynistic insults in the wake of Trump’s claim during the campaign that Haitian immigrants were eating dogs and cats in Springfield, Ohio. Later, its special projects editor was targeted in a swatting attack.

• Noncitizen journalists with visas, Green Cards or other temporary immigration statuses may have to weigh the risk of being detained while covering protests or immigration raids and consider what an arrest might mean for their residency in the United States.

• In some cases, news organizations might find that some of their journalists are included on lists of “enemies” of the Trump administration who might require additional security measures because of the potential for fringe elements to take those lists seriously. Ivan Raiklin, a retired army reserve Lt. Col. who worked in the Defense Intelligence Agency has been trying to recruit sheriffs in rural, conservative counties to carry out live-streamed swatting raids against hundreds of people on a Deep State target list, including 40 journalists. Kash Patel also put a list of “government gangsters” in one of his books, focused on politicians. The wholesale pardoning of Jan 6 defendants, including those engaged in violence against police officers, could foster an assumption of impunity in extremist circles.

• There is a risk of Project Veritas-style “gotcha” attacks to undermine the credibility of journalists. Government news conferences will include not just journalists who are there to cover the news but others who might be there to report on the journalists and how they question officials.

• This could also happen when journalists reach out to government officials or other official spokespeople to verify a report or get a comment. The official might try to “out” them or pre-empt their reporting by sharing their inquiry on social media. This might occur before the news organization has finished its reporting and might involve an attempt to undermine the integrity of the reporter or the publication. This occurred before the inauguration of the second Trump administration while ProPublica was investigating Trump’s nominee for defense secretary.

• Diaspora media, such as Chinese media, Iranian media, or Russian media, may become a target of the US government or Trump supporters due to US government policies and objectives, as well as a target of their home governments.

• The overly hostile operating environment will place added psychological stress on journalists already exposed to emotional challenges in their work.

• An assumption that the United States is a benign working environment for most journalists is no longer valid, and instead news organizations will need to operate as if they were in a more challenging place, such as Hungary or Turkey.

• These risks apply as much to small newsrooms as to large ones, and also to independent journalists, but small newsrooms and freelance journalists are unlikely to have the resources to defend themselves or may need to apply different mitigations.

• The US government’s stance on both domestic and foreign policy issues could also affect the safety of American journalists overseas.

• There are some signs the United States under Trump may be on a pathway to some sort of autocracy. Media organizations and journalists will have to decide when the time has come to start preparing for such a possibility as it would imply even greater security challenges than the industry and the profession already face.

Mitigations

• Audit organizational structure to make sure you are clear about who manages risk and how, and who responds to and manages a situation. Smaller news organizations should consider having one editor take charge of the risk portfolio, providing support to other editors and journalists throughout the organization.

• Conduct risk assessments for all news assignments that touch on the government, cultural issues and economic management.

• Review basic physical security of offices, newsrooms, printing operations and other facilities.

• A degree of supervision is recommended for all news assignments about the government, its main players, the economy, culture or the environment. This more than anything ensures more than one person is considering the potential risks and fallout from reporting on an issue.

• Thoughtful editing of news stories touching on the government to ensure you can anticipate and prepare for any potential post-publication fallout.

• Set up consistent monitoring of fallout and backlash to news stories.

• Review policies on visible branding for reporting teams in the field.

• Build resilience in the newsroom and among key reporting teams, such as political reporters, to harassment through awareness raising and safety training.

• Review overall safety training needs and policies, and decide if resources should be allocated to basic hostile environment instruction, information security training, and legal awareness workshops for journalists covering protests, immigration, reproductive rights, and other hot button issues.

• Review support in newsrooms and from management for journalists who might be at increased risk due to their identities. Ensure identity-connected risks are considered in risk assessments.

• Consider whether journalists from marginalized groups need to take documents proving immigration status on assignments that might involve encounters with police or immigration enforcement agents.

• Have clear management policies for responding to harassment or attacks and supporting targeted journalists.

• Review policies on personal protective equipment, including body armor, ballistic and riot helmets, gas masks, and eye protection, locations where it might be helpful to store PPE, and situations in which it would be appropriate to use PPE.

• Public appearance training may be helpful for some journalists who could be ambushed by Project Veritas-style questioners at public events, or during televised news conferences.

• Media that become aware of journalists being included on enemies lists should try to share that information with the targeted news organizations or individuals.

• Additional security measures, such as home security systems, close protection if warranted, and more, for any journalists included on these lists.

Resources

IWMF: Free one-on-one safety consultations for qualified applicants.
CPJ: Free safety consultations on digital and physical security.
ACOS Alliance: They can provide recommendations for safety training and other resources.

Risk Assessments

CPJ Emergencies Risk Assessment Template
IWMF and PEN America presentation on risk assessments
ACOS Alliance assignment safety checklist
Rory Peck Trust Guidance Notes for completing a risk assessment

Training

PEN America: online harassment and basic digital security
Freedom of the Press Foundation: online harassment, digital security, advanced secure communications, working with leaked filed
RCFP: legal training, including know your rights training for covering protests
IWMF: Domestic HEFAT (hostile environment and first aid training)

2. Access to Information

Risk Factors to Consider

• Denial of accreditations and sidelining of critical media at key events.

• Deterrence of whistleblowers through aggressive rhetoric, investigations, and retaliation. Potential whistleblowers in the second Trump administration will likely have to navigate demands for loyalty, threats of investigations and imprisonment, accusations of treason, and determined Trump supporters seeking to unmask their identities.

• Access to objective and accurate statistics. The replacement of career bureaucrats with political appointees might undermine the credibility of official statistics.

• Access to truthful official information from administration spokespeople.

• Removal of access to desk space in the White House and other government agencies.

• Denial or revoking of visas for foreign journalists.

• How will the identity of journalists affect their ability to get information, and report on important aspects of the story ranging from immigration to far-right militias?

• Intimidation of regular sources whose organizations rely on government funding or other support.

• Exclusion of journalists serving immigrant and other underserved communities.

• Slow-walking or ignoring of FOIA requests.

• Some journalists and news organizations might hold off from aggressively seeking information they know could trigger a confrontation with the authorities or with Trump supporters.

Mitigations

• Solidarity among media with regard to negotiating access and accreditations. At the local level, regional news organizations should reach out to state press associations to see if they are serving this function.

• Data journalism skills will be needed to help with the verification of official information and statistics. Expanded access to investigative techniques (i.e. OSINT tools) for smaller outlets.

• Alternative sources of official statistics. For example, during government shutdowns, some economists and researchers use private sector job data from ADP, to track how many jobs the economy is creating or losing.

• Using data journalism to create new databases and government databases are scrubbed and taken offline.

• Review support in newsrooms and from management for journalists who might be at increased risk due to their identities. Ensure identity-connected risks are considered in risk assessments.

• Consider whether journalists from marginalized groups need to take documents proving immigration status on assignments that might involve encounters with police or immigration enforcement agents.

• Improve efforts to protect the identity of potential whistleblowers and other sources through improved information security practices (use of Signal for communications, hard drive and document encryption, etc) and tools to preserve their anonymity while submitting information (SecureDrop for instance).

• Expand legal support for whistleblowers and for access to information efforts.

Resources

• RCFP hotline for public record issues

• Signal: a free mobile and desktop app that is the gold standard for end-to-end encrypted communications

• IWMF safety training: free HEFATs for freelance journalists and bespoke safety workshops for newsrooms

• Freedom of the Press Foundation: they document press freedom violations in the US via US Press Freedom Tracker, offer a range of digital security training, and operate the open-source whistleblower submission system Secure Drop.

• Affordable self-paced online course on OSINT and investigative techniques.

• GIJN has many videos, tipsheets, guides and other resources on data journalism.

• INN and Reporters Committee Legal Defense hotline for FOIA support.

Whistleblower Support Organizations

These organizations support Whistleblowers through advocacy and legal resources. Journalists or newsrooms may recommend to vulnerable sources that they reach out to these organizations directly.

• The Signals Network (not to be confused with Signal)

• WHISPer

3. Legal Threats or Pressure

Risk Factors to Consider

• Potential increase in official legal actions and subpoenas at the federal and state levels.

• Private lawsuits from President Trump and other wealthy allies including Elon Musk, will likely continue.

• The Justice Department and FBI could be instructed to go after targets determined by the president. The FBI could also decide to investigate organizations it considered subversive, such as occurred between 1956 and 1971 when the bureau conducted a series of covert and illegal actions against political organizations.

• Being targeted by the Trump administration could also result in heavy physical security costs if there is a need to protect against a wider threat from MAGA loyalists or fringe elements.

• Potential use of the Espionage Act against journalists for reporting on classified information, including use of subpoenas and other tools to obtain records or identify confidential sources, as well as possibility of investigations or charges directed at reporters for soliciting, receiving, or publishing national defense secrets.

• Congressional subpoenas to journalists and newsroom leaders, which raise novel and difficult legal questions.

• Secret FISA authorizations or subpoenas obliging telecom and internet companies to provide access to call and email records of journalists. The first Trump administration secretly sought email and phone records of reporters from CNN, The New York Times, and the Washington Post, to identify their sources, as well as members of congress, but did not resort to FISA for that.

• Changes to or rescission of the DOJ News Media Guidelines, which limit when and how DOJ can use subpoenas and other investigative tools to obtain records from or of journalists, or to force them to identify confidential sources (doubly concerning because no federal law).

• Tax audits of journalists, news organizations, and sources to intimidate and harass. Some of Trump’s critics say they are asking their accountants to make their tax returns bullet proof to reduce their potential vulnerabilities.

• Law enforcement ignoring, slow-walking or outright dismissing complaints by journalists.

• Widespread use of SLAPPS (strategic lawsuits against public participation) to silence critical voices and reporting.

• Private lawsuits could be brought in pro-Trump jurisdictions where the jury pool is likely to be politically ill-disposed against the media as a result of Trump’s verbal assaults over the years.

• Newsroom lawyers consider it possible there could be a concerted campaign to escalate a defamation case to the Supreme Court in an effort to overturn the landmark 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which requires public officials and public figures to prove “actual malice” to prevail in defamation claims. Weighing against the likelihood of this is the fact that current defamation laws also protect conservative-leaning media like Fox and Newsmax. It would also take time.

• Given the fragile state of the industry, there is a risk of news organizations throwing in the towel and settling cases they would likely have won to make problems go away as quickly as possible rather than standing their ground.

• Threats of government investigation and prosecutions could persuade journalists or news outlets to self-censor.

Mitigations

• Inventory legal, regulatory and compliance needs and be prepared to increase legal support either by expanding in-house capacity or via access to pro-bono networks (see resources section below).

• Review of libel insurance policies as effective mitigation.

• Review and bullet proof prior tax returns.

Resources

• RCFP’s Reporter’s Privilege Compendium gives detailed guidance on the reporter’s privilege and shield laws in each state and in the federal circuit courts.

• ACOS Alliance curated list of legal resources

Support Organizations

• Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press: A nonprofit organization that provides legal assistance, resources, and advocacy to support the rights of journalists and news organizations and operates a legal hotline 24/7.

• Media Law Resource Center: A membership-based organization that offers legal resources, training, and support for media professionals, focusing on issues like libel, privacy, and freedom of the press.

• Lawyers for Reporters: A pro bono legal service that provides transactional and pre-publication legal assistance to local and nonprofit news organizations, helping them navigate media law challenges. It also operates, Reporters Shield, a membership-based insurance legal support program.

• First Amendment Coalition (FAC): Provides legal assistance, advocacy, and resources to protect press freedom, open government, and First Amendment rights.

• Legal Network for Journalists at Risk (LNJAR): A global coalition that connects journalists facing legal threats with pro bono legal assistance, advocacy, and emergency support to protect press freedom.

• Student Press Law Center (SPLC): Offers free legal advice and resources to student journalists and educators on media law and First Amendment issues.

Additional Reading

News organizations are playing Russian Roulette with Libel Insurance, by Dick Tofel.

4. Regulatory Threats or Pressure

Risk Factors to Consider

• Federal opposition to mergers and acquisitions. Federal opposition to mergers and acquisitions among media companies at a time when the sector is expected to go through a round of consolidations could be a serious threat to business plans and long-term sustainability.

• There could be challenges to licenses of media that use public airwaves for radio and TV broadcasts.

• Regulatory pressure on ancillary businesses, such as threatening to raise postal rates for delivery firms like Amazon, attempts to change the statutory, regulatory or tax environment for an entertainment park like a Disneyland or for the production of films.

• Threats to withhold government contracts for corporations that also have media interests.

• Cancelling government subscriptions to newswires and specialist content like Politico Pro.

• Congressional, federal and state level investigations into fact checking organizations. Fact checking organizations are under assault around the world; Conservative groups in the United States accuse these organizations and newsrooms of spreading “disinformation” or of censoring conservative voices. Social media companies like X have tweaked their platforms to make it harder for researchers and fact checkers to study the extent of disinformation they promulgate. Meta ended its U.S. fact-checking program.

• Trump’s FCC Commissioner, Brendan Carr, says he wants to dismantle what he calls a “censorship cartel.” He has already warned Meta, Alphabet, Microsoft and Apple that he will be coming after fact-checking organizations he claimed silenced conservative viewpoints and Newsguard, a company that validates the integrity and trustworthiness of media for advertisers and others.

• There could also be congressional, federal and state level investigations into other areas of statutory compliance, such as the fairness of the media’s news coverage, diversity policies, comment moderation efforts, and the use of freelance journalists.

• Nonprofit news organizations face the same threats as others but also have some unique statutory considerations that could create vulnerabilities. They are also often smaller and less well-resourced.

• Nonprofits face heightened and perhaps unwarranted enforcement of existing restrictions on 501(c)(3) organizations. Loss of nonprofit status could shut down newsrooms funded via private philanthropy or grants:

  • Limits on lobbying: reporting on proposed legislation could be interpreted as lobbying.
  • Ban on campaigning: reporting on elected officials could be interpreted as campaign interference.
  • Limits on endorsement: reporting on electoral candidates could be interpreted as favoring or disfavoring one.
  • Limits on advertising: qualified sponsorships could be interpreted as advertising and revenue from it as UBI.
  • Limits on private inurement: related-party transactions could attract unwarranted attention.

• The legal threats to nonprofits also may focus on sources of revenue:

  • Donors, foundations and individuals may face harassment or legal actions for funding local news organizations.
  • Diversity-based funding is likely to be vulnerable to challenges.
  • Defamation claims over investigations could include donors for facilitating the reporting.
  • Anonymous donors may be the subject of legal actions for disclosure on purported national security grounds.
  • Sharing subscriber information could be a focus of privacy-based or consumer fraud complaints.

• There are additional existential threats to nonprofits, and statutory compliance issues that could be used to pressure them:

  • The IRS may determine that journalism does not qualify as “education” pursuant to Section 501(c)(3).
  • Legislation, such as the House considered last term, might authorize the Treasury Secretary to strip a nonprofit of tax exemption based on a determination that the entity is providing material support for terrorism. House GOP members wrote to several states in 2024 telling them to investigate charities that supported Palestinian causes. Accusations of supporting terrorism, even if successfully countered, can deal irreparable damage to an organization’s reputation and credibility.
  • The relative complexity of nonprofits might make media insurance harder to obtain or afford.
  • Having board members in addition to staff makes nonprofits more vulnerable to intimidation and complaints.

• The IRS might devote extra resources to auditing selected or multiple journalism nonprofits based on their profiles or reporting.

• Employment tax enforcement for misclassifying freelancers threatens smaller, poorer news organizations more.

• Federal and state tax inquiries or audits are more complicated and could be highly draining of scarce resources.

• State attorneys general may increase the use of consumer protection investigations to pressure community-focused news organizations. Texas state Attorney General Ken Paxton has gone after nonprofits supporting immigrants or voting rights. Paxton has used consumer protection laws against nonprofits under a theory that editorial decisions can violate those laws. Volunteers and paid staff will be less willing to work with nonprofits if they attract hostile scrutiny from state authorities.

• Threats at a state level against smaller news organizations, including nonprofits, may not be as visible as threats toward larger national newsrooms and therefore may not attract support or solidarity.

• Limit government funding of public media. Studies and surveys have shown dozens of news stations would likely have to shut down and tens of millions of people in mainly rural areas might lose their main or only source of local news if government money was pulled out of public media.

• Denial of visas to foreign journalists.

• Denial of, threat of revoking, or actual revocation of legal status and deportation of immigrant journalists (i.e., permanent residency for someone with TPS or going through the years-long asylum seeker process.)

• Suppression of content or traffic to outlets’ platforms that might affect monetization or pulling government advertising orders.

• Captured media: Trump allies could try to exert more control over the media landscape by capturing struggling media outlets and interfering in editorial independence, while existing owners of media outlets may decide their business interests are best served if they tone down the political coverage of their newspaper or agency.

• Lots of media owners or major players contributed to Trump’s inauguration or to his future presidential library, and sent representatives to Mar-a-Lago to pay their respects. Many companies, such as Facebook, are abandoning long-pursued diversity policies or fact-checking activities. Business owners of major newspapers stopped their outlets from endorsing Trump’s opponent in the election. Yet, journalistic culture, independence and push back remain strong and civil society, while bruised, is robust. There is more diversity of media business models in the United States than in Hungary or Turkey, for instance, where the state came to control much of the media sector.

• Trump and many of the people in his orbit are admirers of Hungarian leader Viktor Orban, who by some accounts has managed to take up to 80 percent of the Hungarian media under his or his party’s effective control. But the Hungarian and US media markets are different - large U.S. media organizations, for instance, are not as dependent on government advertising although community/ethnic media often are.

Mitigations

• Inventory legal needs and be prepared to increase legal support either by expanding in-house capacity or via access to pro-bono networks (see resources section below).

• Coordinated legal and advocacy support (i.e., media law, immigration law SMEs).

• Coordinated legal action against state authorities using consumer protection or other laws for political purposes.

• Statutory compliance check-ups, covering all areas of potential vulnerability, could enable nonprofits to anticipate and try to prevent enforcement actions. Various legal organizations supporting journalism are developing such check-up programs.

• Nonprofits could collaborate and even combine partly or fully to have more resources to defend themselves. (INN Days June 3-5, 2025, in Minneapolis.)

• Audit and bullet-proof tax returns. Improved tax management among nonprofits to minimize risks.

• Solidarity among media organizations and coordinated advocacy including strategic litigation.

• In extreme situations, newsrooms might want to examine the possibility of relocating out of states targeting nonprofits, fact checkers or community-focused newsrooms to more friendly jurisdictions, with due concern for the creation of news deserts and the potential impact on their ability to conduct deep, on-the-ground reporting.

• To combat the spread of captured media, newsrooms could establish editorial structures that seek to enshrine independence of the newsroom. Newsroom managers could pursue the establishment of institutional firewalls between editorial and other corporate units in large companies.

• Nonprofit business structures may help to ensure newsroom independence, despite the other constraints and challenges that solution brings.

• Vigorous reporting and commenting on newsroom interference can potentially act as a deterrent.

Resources

TrustLaw: A service of the Thomson Reuters Foundation, TrustLaw connects news organizations with pro bono legal assistance and expert legal resources.
Institute for Nonprofit News: A membership organization that supports nonprofit newsrooms with funding opportunities, training, collaboration networks, and business development resources.
LION Publishers: A professional association that provides independent local news organizations with training, coaching, funding opportunities, and operational support.
Pro Journ: A program of the nonprofit Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press that helps journalists and news organizations access pro bono legal services, particularly in areas such as public records access and pre-publication review.

5. Information Security

Risk Factors to Consider

• The Justice Department and other agencies use surveillance authorities to target journalists. There are legal constraints on domestic spying by U.S. government agencies, yet the U.S. intelligence community is among the most sophisticated and well-resourced cyber powers on the planet.

• Active monitoring of government workers, congressional aides, journalists, and others to plug leaks or simply to intimidate. Aggressive surveillance by the state could be a major deterrent to whistleblowers and sources in general.

• US intelligence agencies use existing SIGINT capabilities and/or expand their use of commercially available spyware to gather information about journalists operating outside the United States. There are few constraints abroad against spying on non-US journalists and their sources, and US journalists could be caught up in these activities.

• US intelligence agencies aggressively pursue use of commercially available information about journalists from data broker services. Often underrated, intelligence operatives say the amount of information that can be gleaned from commercial data aggregation services is immensely useful and valuable.

• The platforms of many tech-billionaire supporters of the president, including X and Meta, gather enormous amounts of data about their users, including journalists. Any collusion with US intelligence agencies could make surveillance pervasive.

• Far right or other extremist groups could deploy cyber weapons and increasingly sophisticated phishing attacks against critics, including journalists.

• Customs and Border Protection more aggressively seeks access to journalists’ devices and data at border crossings and uses surveillance to track journalists covering the immigration beat.

• Some journalists working particular beats, such as at the White House or investigating the business interests of political players, may face higher risks than others. Local newsrooms focusing on uncontroversial community news are unlikely to fall into the crosshairs of federal surveillance. However, any collusion between the intelligence authorities and the big tech companies supporting the Trump administration could make surveillance pervasive.

• The US government decides to illegally spy on journalists in the United States.

• Foreign governments increase attempts at surveillance of US journalists in the United States in order to get intelligence on the Trump administration or on their own nationals.

• Current digital security among media is unlikely to be adequate if the resources of the US intelligence community are brought to bear on US journalists and their sources.

• International media have found a way to function in jurisdictions around the world where journalists need to assume they are under constant surveillance, such as China and Russia. That said, domestic media organizations in China, Russia, and other similar locations operate under severe constraints and many independent news operations end up moving abroad into exile in order to be free to pursue news coverage. State surveillance is one of the reasons.

Mitigations

• Review the information security practices and policies of every newsroom. This should include basic communication tools, storage of data, data retention policies and data classification policies. It should also consider BYOD (bring your own device) policies, and how to bring freelance contributors within a newsroom’s information security envelope.

• Coordinate with legal support, as some information security mitigation measures may conflict with other efforts to protect newsrooms against risks. For instance, the use of encrypted communications, or disappearing messages, could undermine efforts to collect material needed to prove during defamation trials that journalists and editors conducted due diligence, fact checks, and operated professionally before publication of a news story.

• Improve information security practices and basic digital hygiene among journalists, including use of Signal for encrypted communications, hard drive and document encryption, and other steps. Checklists for digital hygiene.

• Coordinate and promote access to tools for basic hygiene and other efforts to reduce sheer volume of information, which is so overwhelming, it can be a deterrent to taking action.

• Specialized digital literacy training, including for journalists not considered to be reporting on sensitive issues, and freelancers.

• Efforts to protect the identity of potential whistleblowers and regular sources through improved information security practices (use of Signal for communications, etc) and tools to preserve their anonymity (SecureDrop for instance).

• Dedicated information security specialists in those newsrooms that have sufficient resources to allocate to this. Greater use by small newsrooms of training and advisory resources supplied by Freedom of the Press Foundation, and others.

• A realization that an information security stance long considered appropriate in more difficult operating environments like China is now something that might need to be considered in the United States.

Support Organizations

Freedom of the Press Foundation: A nonprofit that provides training, digital security tools, and consulting services to newsrooms and journalists to strengthen their digital security.
Media Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (Media ISAO): A member driven organization working to promote news media resilience, especially relating to risks with a digital or cyber security nexus.
AccessNow Digital Security Emergency Helpline: Provides 24/7 rapid-response support to journalists and news organizations facing digital threats, including hacking, censorship, and online surveillance.
Global Cyber Alliance: Provides free cybersecurity tools, phishing protection, DNS security services, and training to help news organizations safeguard their digital infrastructure.
Electronic Frontier Foundation: Provides legal support, security guides, and tools like HTTPS Everywhere and Privacy Badger to enhance digital privacy and security for journalists.
CyberPeaceBuilders: A volunteer network that offers pro bono cybersecurity assistance, risk assessments, and training to protect nonprofits, including journalists and media organizations, from cyberattacks.

Tools

SecureDrop: An open-source, encrypted communication platform developed by Freedom of the Press Foundation that allows journalists to securely receive tips and documents from anonymous sources.
Signal: A secure, end-to-end encrypted messaging app that journalists can use to communicate privately with sources, colleagues, and news organizations.

Additional Resources

The GCA Cybersecurity Toolkit for Journalists by the Global Cybersecurity Alliance
Security Planner from Consumer Reports will help you make a personalized plan for protecting your digital life and guide you through the implementation steps
Surveillance Self-Defense: Tips, Tools and How-Tos for Safer Online Communications by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
Journalist’s Toolbox—Digital Security by the Society for Professional Journalists
Mobile security tips: Nine steps to prepare your phone before an action by Freedom of the Press Foundation
Google Advanced Protection Program for securing your Google accounts
Protecting your digital security: The layers of risk that journalists face by The Groundtruth Project
Reporters Without Borders’s Helpdesk has a series of guides and free online courses on basic digital security for journalists.

6. Online Harassment

Risk Factors to Consider

• Trump and other public figures mobilize a far-right ecosystem of allies online in support of targeted mob attacks on news organizations or individual journalists as “enemies of the people.” These online attacks lead to confrontations, stalking, or physical attacks, putting the lives of journalists and offices of news organizations in real-life danger. Online harassment already occurs at volume.

• Emboldened extremist voices online go after reporters who criticize the boss and become more likely to follow up on online harassment with physical acts, such as in-person confrontations or physical violence.

• Platforms become a more aggressive environment for journalists as social media companies abandon content moderation and fact-checking efforts and allow more hate speech and disinformation to proliferate.

• Constant accusations against minority journalists and women journalists of being diversity hires. Women, Black, LGBTQ, journalists of color, and those from minority religions are disproportionately targeted and surveys have shown that as many as 30 percent respond to online harassment with self-censorship, and a third even consider leaving the profession.

• Political reporters self-censor when questioning Trump or other government officials in televised settings because they fear an avalanche of abuse, including doxing, swatting and other harassment, if they criticize, embarrass or are seen to harangue the officials.

• More general self-censorship across the profession, including many considering abandoning journalism. The ferocity and volume of online attacks against women journalists, Black journalists, journalists of color, and journalists from other marginalized groups could force many out of the profession, undermining the diversity of the press corps and eroding the quality and overall relevance of journalism.

• Online harassment can have deep emotional and psychological impact and organized online campaigns can seriously harm their targets and their families.

• The release online of personal information, such as an address, can make online abuse more devastating. Weak US privacy protections and the data brokerage industry make it easier for potential attackers to find sensitive information about journalists that can be used against them.

• The resources required to monitor online harassment and the costs of defending against it will rise if more online attacks result in physical violence.

• Swatting attacks in the United States are extremely dangerous because of the likelihood of police going in with weapons drawn. People have died as a result of swatting attacks.

Mitigations

• Build up resilience of newsrooms by increasing awareness among journalists, reducing online vulnerabilities through self-doxxing exercises, and by supporting targeted journalists.

• Establish a policy for handling online abuse in the newsroom and set up reporting and escalation channels.

• Basic information security training for all journalists. It should include online harassment. Any wider hostile environment training conducted for a newsroom should also include information security and online harassment.

• Social media policies at news organizations should not just include what journalists can do online but also how to respond and get help for online harassment.

• All newly hired staff should go through an onboarding process and safety briefing, including on online harassment, the risks they face, where to get help, how to reduce their online vulnerabilities, and so on.

• Mechanisms to monitor online harassment, and also tools to triage and analyze threats to identify the serious ones that require a response. New tools may be able to automate this process.

• Newsrooms should consider the use of services that regularly check data broker websites for personal information and submit opt-out requests.

• Emotional support through peer networks or trauma programs.

• Provide immediate support in wake of attacks, including funds for or provision of physical security/personal protective equipment if necessary.

Support Organizations

PEN America: Provides training, resources, and direct support to journalists facing online abuse, including digital safety workshops, response guides, and co-runs a safety helpline for U.S. journalists experiencing online abuse.
International Women’s Media Foundation (IWMF): Offers emergency assistance, digital security training, and mental health resources to support women journalists experiencing online harassment and threats.
Tall Poppy: Provides services for employers to protect their staff from online harassment and cyber attacks.
Brightlines: Works with employers to keep vulnerable employees safe from online harms by providing extensive data scrubbing services.
Memetica: Specializes in digital investigations, monitoring, and countering online harassment campaigns targeting journalists and media professionals.
Dart Center for Journalism & Trauma: Provides mental health resources, trauma-informed training, and peer support networks for journalists dealing with online abuse and harassment.
Vita Activa: Operates a hotline and provides crisis response and psychological support for journalists and activists experiencing online harassment and threats in Spanish and English.
TrollBusters: Offers real-time support, reputation management, and digital self-defense strategies to help women journalists combat online abuse and cyber harassment.

Tools

DeleteMe data deletion service
Optery data deletion service
Kanary data deletion service

Additional Resources

Digital Safety Guide, an in-depth guide on safety precautions against online harassment
What to do if you’ve been doxed
U.S. Election Safety Summer by PEN America, the International Women’s Media Foundation, and the Committee to Protect Journalists
How to Document Online Abuse
PEN America’s Digital Safety Snacks for a series of short videos on cleaning up your online footprint
The Rise of the Security Champion: Beta-testing Newsroom Security Cultures by the Tow Center for Digital Journalism
Know Your Trolls, a free online course for journalists to identify their online abusers by IWMF
How to Use an Action Plan When Facing Online Harassment by Election SOS
What to Do When You Are Being Targeted With Online Abuse by IPI offers advice specific to freelance journalists
IPI On the Line: A comprehensive guide for newsrooms to address online harassment targeting their journalists and organizations.

7. More Dangerous Policing and Protests

Risk Factors to Consider

• There were many civil rights abuses during the Black Lives Matter protests in Trump’s first term. Over 100 journalists were arrested and over 400 were attacked or assaulted, 80 percent at the hands of the police. Federal officers in cities like Portland also were alleged to have targeted journalists with use of force and detentions.

• Trump deployed the National Guard in Washington during protests and considered invoking the Insurrection Act of 1807, which gives the president the power to deploy the US military domestically in certain circumstances such as a rebellion.

• The level of violence that journalists might have to prepare for could be higher if active service troops are used to police discontent, rather than simply serve in a support role to civilian police forces. One early act of the new government was to send troops to the southern border to help enforce immigration rules. National Guard or active service troops are not trained to police civilians but rather to kill and destroy an enemy.

• If they deploy with military grade weaponry and vehicles, the risk of harm could soar.

• Vigilante groups are also stepping up to aid the Trump administration in its efforts, including against illegal immigration. These groups are generally armed and not trained in civil rights.

• The proliferation of weapons makes protests in the United States a severe challenge for media safety and both the right and the left have been increasingly turning up armed.

• Newsroom lawyers fear state laws that could allow drivers in cars to run over armed protesters, and court cases, such as the acquittal of Kyle Rittenhouse for fatally shooting two people during unrest in Kenosha, Wis., could make people more inclined to shoot if they feel threatened.

• Protesters from both the right and the left are increasingly using masks to hide their identities. This means they might be contemplating engaging in a crime and do not want to be photographed or filmed. Journalists covering these events face increasing hostility from all participants.

• Immigrant profiling should be expected. Journalists with green cards or others whose immigration status could be at risk if arrested should take that risk into consideration.

Mitigations

• Pre-assignment risk assessments should be carried out before sending journalists to cover protests.

• More widespread hostile environment training for newsrooms. For protests, journalists should be made aware of how to respond to an arrest or an order to disperse and where to seek legal support if needed.

• Increased use when appropriate and safe to do so of personal protective equipment, including rifle plates, while covering protests. The use of PPE has to be weighed against the risk of attracting hostile attention as a result.

• Journalists should consider proof of immigration status packets, etc.

• Increased media collaboration/pool access to include smaller newsrooms whose journalists face too high a risk to cover certain events.

• Use of back-watchers. These do not have to be security professionals but could be journalists with a good sense of logistics and safety whose task is to be a second pair of eyes, and to be situationally aware, rather than glued to a camera viewfinder.

• Stricter security protocols, including no visible branding, reduced numbers of journalists assigned to each protest, increased supervision, greater willingness to withdraw to safety once police or military action unfolds.

• Greater use of drones, satellite images, Google maps and other sources of information and visuals.

• Increased funds assigned to helping small newsrooms or freelance journalists access safety training.

• More legal support for journalists covering protests.

Support Organizations

IWMF: Free one-on-one safety consultations for qualified applicants.

CPJ: Free safety consultations on digital and physical security for covering protests.

Resources

RCFP Police, Protesters and the Press Guide
RCFP Hotline
RCFP Best practices guidance for police-press interactions at protests
CPJ Resources for Journalists Covering Protests

Additional Reading

Covering Democracy: Protests, Police and the Press, by Joel Simon. Published by Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia, June 2023.

8. Burnout and Mental Health

Risk Factors to Consider

• Reporting under conditions of hostility or in the face of threats to your life, family, welfare, or freedom can be extremely stressful.

• The pace of news in the first Trump administration was unrelenting given the chaos and the start of his second term has been no different.

• Not every news organization has a robust structure in place to support the mental and emotional health of their journalists in such demanding circumstances as the industry is likely to face over the next four years. The subject continues to be stigmatized in the industry and many media managers do not consider it necessary to take measures.

• Financial pressures on the industry, widespread layoffs among journalists, continuing transformation in how people consume news (or content) and value it, and interference in newsroom independence all add to the pressures journalists operate under.

• Freelance journalists and reporters from historically underserved communities may be particularly vulnerable because of their isolation but often fall through the gaps even when newsrooms take steps to support the mental and emotional health of their journalists.

Mitigations

• Ensure that entry-level journalists have the tools necessary to cover particularly sensitive/traumatic events.
  • Develop a buddy system (cross-newsroom or internal).
  • Manager training, infrastructure support.
  • Mental health support via an employee benefits program, a dedicated trauma program, or personal therapist already providing services.
  • Peer networks, journalists supporting journalists.
  • Enlist lawyers to review sick leave policies and policies around mental health.
  • Awareness raising and training for everyone including lawyers. Lawyers can walk employees through how to update benefits policies to include mental health support.
  • Train the trainers program for managers and other employees - how to spot burnout, etc.
  • Ensuring there are sufficient newsroom resources and adequate staffing/funding to cover the news. Perhaps the question is what can you do less of? Instead of how can you cover x or y with fewer people? Fundamentally, it is an issue of prioritization.
  • Rotation of assignments after a long or harrowing deployment.
  • Increase benefits around leave and make them mental health friendly. Medical leave - 30-day mental health leave, caregiving leave, etc. Expanding sick days to include mental wellness and caregiving duties.
  • Ensure freelancers, interns, independent journalists do not fall through the cracks.
  • Need for more dedicated roles around safety and care of employee experience.
  • Make a standard practice of debriefing staff and their managers or teams after difficult assignments. Give folks a space to expose these issues and let them bubble up.

Resources

• IWMF Mental Health Guide for Journalists
• CPJ Safety and Emergencies support
• DART Center
• Mental health AI chatbots (with some caveats)

About the Author

The Journalism Protection Initiative is a center of the Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism at the City University of New York. It gives journalists and newsrooms practical guidance, tools and support so they can continue to work in an increasingly adversarial environment.